Psychology & Economics, Experimental Economics, Game Theory, Mechanism Design
“Silence is Golden: Communication Costs and Team Problem Solving” (with Gary Charness and David Cooper), 2020, Experimental Economics, 23, 668-693.
“Second-Best Mechanisms for Land Assembly and Hold-Out Problems” (with Jonathan Pincus, Perry Shapiro, and Dugyu Yengin), 2019, Journal of Public Economics, 175, 1-16.
“Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving: Learning from Non-results,” (with Joël van der Weele), 2017, Games, 8(3), 36-49. Supplementary Material.
“Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions,” (with Joël van der Weele), 2017, Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(1), 173-217. Supplementary Data.
"Self-Signaling and Social-Signaling in Giving," 2015, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 117, 26-39.
"Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences," 2014, Management Science, 60(11), 2659-2665. [Online Appendix]
"The Control Premium: A Preference for Payoff Autonomy," with Dave Owens and Ryan Fackler, 2014, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(4), 138-61.
"Shifting the Blame to a Powerless Intermediary," with Regine Oexl, 2013, Experimental Economics, 16(3), 306-312.
"An Unlucky Feeling: Overconfidence and Noisy Feedback," with Dave Owens, 2012, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 84(2), 510-524.
"On Relations of Invariants for Vector-Valued Bilinear Forms," with Thomas Garrity, 2004, Electronic Journal of Linear Algebra, 11, 24-40.
“Unwillingly Informed: the Prosocial Impact of Third-Party Informers,” (2025) with Tony Hua, Karine Nyborg, and Jo Thori Lind.
"Land Assemblage: Efficiency and Equity in Public-Private Projects" with Jonathan Pincus and Perry Shapiro, 2014, Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker, eds., 14-32, Edward Elgar.
“Image Incentives with Team Production”
“The Illusion of Observation: Can Watchful Eyes Nudge Against Self-Serving Ignorance?” (with Tony Hua)
"Evaluating the Tradeoff Between Efficiency and Property Rights in Assembly Mechanisms"
“Prosocial Ignorance”